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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3429 
___________ 
 
JAMES D. SCHNELLER;  
FRIENDS OF JIM SCHNELLER FOR CONGRESS, C/O James D. Schneller, 
           Appellants 
 
v. 
 
PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS INC, Its Owners and Employees;  
WILLIAM BENDER; DELAWARE COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY;  
PAT MEEHAN FOR CONGRESS; PATRICIA A. WECHSLER;  
ERNESTO S. ANGELOS; DONALD ADAMS; TERI ADAMS;  
DELAWARE COUNTY PATRIOTS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-05071) 
District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 14, 2014 
 
Before:  FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 25, 2014) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 James D. Schneller was an independent candidate for Congress in Pennsylvania’s 
Seventh District in the 2010 general election.  “Friends of Jim Schneller” was his 
registered candidate committee.  Schneller, for himself and his committee, filed a 
complaint pro se1 against Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. (“PNI”),2 a PNI reporter, the 
Delaware County Republican Party, Pat Meehan for Congress, leaders of the 
Independence Hall Tea Party, the Delaware County Patriots, and two other defendants 
involved in a challenge to Schneller’s nomination papers.  Schneller alleged that the 
defendants defamed, libeled, and otherwise injured him by, inter alia, charging that 
Democrats helped him get on the ballot, that he was a “spoiler” to split the Republican 
vote, and that he engaged in improper conduct, including fraud and a violation of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act.     
 The defendants filed motions to dismiss the action.  The District Court dismissed 
all claims by Friends of Jim Schneller because Schneller, a non-lawyer, could not 
represent his committee in federal court also.  The District Court held that Schneller had 
not set forth facts sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or related statutes, 
noting, among other things, that no allegations supported his assertions that the 
defendants were acting under color of state law or were state actors.  Under a similar 
                                              
1 He sought to proceed in forma pauperis, but the District Court denied the motion.   
 
2 We use “PNI” for convenience, but we are aware that PNI no longer exists, that its 
successor-in-interest filed for bankruptcy protection, and that a subsequent purchaser of 
the company’s assets at auction is purported to be protected from the assumption of 
liability for acts or omissions before the asset purchase (on October 8, 2010) by an asset 
purchase agreement and the terms of the bankruptcy plan, see In re Phila. Newspapers, 
LLC, 450 B.R. 99, 101 (E.D. Pa. Bankr. 2011).    
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rationale, the District Court concluded that Schneller had not stated a claim under Bivens.  
The District Court also held that Schneller had not sufficiently set forth facts to support 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 or § 1986.  The District Court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Schneller’s state law claims.  During the course of the 
analysis, the District Court concluded that amendment would be futile.  The District 
Court entered its order on August 28, 2012.3    
 Schneller filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to proceed in forma 
pauperis (“ifp”) on appeal on behalf of himself and Friends of Jim Schneller.  On June 
18, 2013, the District Court denied the motion for reconsideration, and, on July 2, 2013, 
the District Court denied the motion to proceed ifp on appeal.  Schneller filed two more 
motions to proceed ifp on appeal, the second of which was docketed as a notice of 
appeal.4   
 In this Court, with the opening of his appeal, Schneller filed a motion to proceed 
ifp.  Also, after the District Court ruled on the motion for reconsideration that was the 
basis for the stay, Schneller submitted a “motion for record transmittal and a briefing 
schedule pursuant to trial action’s on pending motions” in which he recounted some of 
the procedural history of his case, noting that there were no longer any pending motions 
                                              
3 Previously, the District Court had denied a motion to recuse filed by Schneller.  
   
4 Schneller also filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 2, 2013 order.  We stayed 
this appeal and directed the parties to file status reports pending its resolution.  
Ultimately, the District Court denied it.     
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in the District Court and requesting the transmittal of the record and the issuance of a 
briefing schedule.   
 Subsequently, the Clerk issued an order to notify Schneller that an attorney must 
enter an appearance for Friends of Jim Schneller or the appeal would be dismissed as to 
that entity.  In response, Jim Schneller, on behalf of himself and Friends of Jim Schneller, 
seeks reconsideration of the Clerk’s order.  He contends that Friends of Jim Schneller 
should be permitted to appear without an attorney because its agent, Schneller himself, is 
a party to the action.  He also argues that Friends of Jim Schneller is like a sole 
proprietorship that should be permitted to proceed pro se.  Schneller also maintains that 
the Clerk’s ruling violated Local Rule 27.6 because the ruling goes beyond the 
ministerial.  Schneller also has filed argument in support of his appeal.   
 We first consider the preliminaries.  We grant Schneller’s motion to proceed ifp.  
See Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948); Walker v. 
People Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989).  We deny Schneller’s 
motion for reconsideration of the Clerk’s order.  The Clerk’s order merely notified him 
that an attorney must enter an appearance for Friends of Jim Schneller or the appeal 
would be dismissed as to that entity.  The notice and warning did not breach the limits of 
ministerial orders or otherwise violate the Local Rules.  Also, at this point, we dismiss the 
appeal as to the Friends of Jim Schneller because Schneller, a non-lawyer, cannot 
represent that entity.  Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.2d 373, 373 (3d Cir. 1966) 
(per curiam).   
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 We note that Schneller’s motion for the transmittal of the record and the issuance 
of a briefing schedule is akin to a status report, which the parties had been ordered to 
provide.  He recounted the then-recent procedural history and noted the District Court’s 
order denying reconsideration.  However, it is a motion insomuch as he also requested 
that the record be transmitted from the District Court and a briefing schedule issue.  The 
record is available electronically, so there is no need for a transmittal of the record.  We 
deny that aspect of his motion as moot, and we also deny his request for the issuance of 
briefing schedule.   
 At this point, we also must dismiss as moot Schneller’s appeal from the order 
denying him ifp status on appeal.  Because we have granted Schneller’s motion to 
proceed ifp on appeal, there is no relief we may give him through review of the District 
Court’s order denying him ifp status on appeal.  See Church of Scientology v. United 
States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Cathcart, 980 F.2d 927, 934 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (“‘Generally, an appeal will be dismissed as moot when events occur during 
[its] pendency . . . which prevent the appellate court from granting any effective relief.’”).      
 We otherwise have jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
review of the order dismissing Schneller’s complaint is plenary.  See McGovern v. City 
of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  Generally, our review of an order denying a 
motion for reconsideration is for abuse of discretion, but, to the extent the denial is based 
on the interpretation and application of a legal precept, our review is plenary.  See 
Koshatka v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1985).  We also review 
the dismissal of state law claims, a refusal to recuse, a denial of leave to amend, and how 
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a district court controls its docket for abuse of discretion.  See De Asencio v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 311 (3d Cir. 2003); Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. 
Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000); Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 
223 (3d Cir. 2004); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).  
Upon review, we will summarily affirm because no substantial issue is raised on appeal.  
See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.      
 The District Court properly dismissed Schneller’s complaint.  As the District 
Court explained, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a cause of action for “merely private 
conduct.”  Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted); see also Max v. Republican Comm. of Lancaster Cnty., 587 
F.3d 198, 200-03 (3d Cir. 2009) (analyzing how and whether a political committee could 
be considered a state actor).  Although Schneller included allegations that defendants 
were acting “under color of state law” and the like, many of the allegations were 
conclusory, and none was sufficiently supported by factual information so as to be 
plausible on its face.5  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).   
 Similarly, Schneller’s allegations related to his conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1985(1), (2), and (3) were conclusory.  Stating that the defendants “conspired” and 
“acted in concert” is not equivalent to pleading a conspiracy with sufficient factual matter 
                                              
5 Similarly, Schneller did not state a Bivens claim.  See Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 
F.3d 789, 801 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that, among other things, a Bivens defendant 
must be a federal actor).   
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to state a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-
78.  Other than using terms like “conspired” and quoting sections of the statutory 
provisions, Schneller did not include allegations that suggested that he has an actionable 
claim under § 1985.  Furthermore, Schneller did not allege, as he must to state a claim 
under § 1985(3), that there was a race- or class-based invidious discriminatory animus for 
the defendants’ action.  See Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Because a § 1985 violation is a predicate for relief under § 1986, Schneller’s § 1986 
claims failed as well.  See Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 1980).      
 Because no federal claims were actionable, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in declining to entertain Schneller’s state law claims.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(c)(3).  We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
leave to amend on the basis of futility, either.  Also, we find no abuse of discretion in the 
District Court’s decision to deny as moot Schneller’s motion to strike what was 
essentially a reply brief that the District Court had considered in deciding the motions to 
dismiss the complaint.  The District Court did not err in denying reconsideration of its 
rulings related to the dismissal of the complaint.   
 The District Court also did not abuse its discretion in declining to recuse.  The 
arguments that Schneller presented did not warrant recusal.  See, e.g., Securacomm 
Consulting, Inc., 224 F.3d at 278 (“We have repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure 
with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal . . . .”).  Furthermore, we 
discern no evidence of partiality or bias in the record.   
8 
 
 For these reasons, and on the basis of the District Court’s analysis, to the extent 
that we have jurisdiction over this appeal, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
As we noted above, we dismiss the appeal as to the Friends of Jim Schneller and dismiss 
the appeal of the District Court’s order denying Schneller permission to proceed ifp.  We 
also grant Schneller’s motion to proceed ifp on appeal and deny all of his other pending 
motions.    
 
